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VALIDITY OF REV-

state of Ohio created a building authority to
which it transferred for a period of twenty-five years certain hospitals and public
land.1 In return the authority promised to repair the hospitals and to construct
a number of new buildings. Bonds to the amount of $7,500,000 were issued
by the authority on a resolution pledging the income to be derived from the
property pursuant to a twenty-three year rent and bond retirement agreement
with the department of welfare. The department promised to charge its patients
enough to meet these obligations, and to make payment possible a statute was
passed allowing the department to retain the money collected from pay patients

1 Ohio Gen. Code (Page, Supp. 1939), §§ 2332-2 to 2332-II, effective as
amended, May 29, 1939.
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instead of turning it in as state revenues. The bonds expressly provided that
payment was to be fulfilled by the faith and credit of the authority and was
not to be a charge against the general credit of the state, which had a constitutional provision limiting state indebtedness to $750,000. In case of default,
a receiver could be appointed to collect the rent. An action in mandamus was
brought against the secretary of state to compel him to attest the bonds. On
demurrer, it was held that bonds issued on the basis of such a resolution and
contract with the department of welfare constitute an indebtedness of the
state. Writ denied. State ex rel. Public Institutional Building Authority v.
Griffith, 135 Ohio St. 604, 22 N. E. (2d) 200 (1939).
There are three general ways in which political subdivisions seek to evade
debt limitations: ( l) a separate corporation may be established which assumes
the debt in place of the state; 2 ( 2) where income producing property is purchased by the state it may be stipulated that the income only is the fund for
payment; 8 (3) a purchase may be ultimately consummated by the state through
rental instalments, no instalment exceeding the debt Iimitation. 4 Each of these
features was embodied in the plan of the principal case, but the project was
nevertheless held invalid. The creation of a separate corporation, whose debts
are not the debt of the state, will be ineffective, as a mere subterfuge, if the
state obligates itself to the corporation or deals with it in a prohibited manner. 5
2
In re Opinion of the Governor, 54 R. I. 45 at 48, 169 A. 748 (1933), where
the court stated: "There is ample authority for holding that a corporation similar in
character and purpose to the Rhode Island Emergency Public Works Corporation is a
quasi-public corporation having a distinct legal entity apart from the state which
caused it to be created. . .. it is our opinion that any debts incurred by the corporation are corporate debts and not debts of the State."
8
Winston v. Spokane, 12 Wash. 524, 4~ P. 888 (1895); Bankhead v. Town of
Sulligent, 229 Ala. 45, 155 So. 869 (1934); Young v. City of Ann Arbor, 267 Mich.
241, 255 N. W. 579 (1934); Kasch v. Miller, 104 Ohio St. 281, 135 N. E. 813
(1922). See the dictum in Miller v. City of Buhl, 48 Idaho 668, 284 P. 843 (1930),
to the effect that a promise to pay out of a special fund would constitute an indebtedness. However, there was a promise by the municipality in that case to maintain a
rate level high enough to cover the debt, and this seems to be the ground of the
decision. The same factor was present in the principal case, but the majority view is
that a promise to maintain a certain rate level is not a promise within the debt
limitation laws. City of Bowling Green v. Kirby, 220 Ky. 839, 295 S. W. 1004
(1927).
4
Annual payments for a sewer farm were not a present liability and did not
violate a debt limitation of the Constitution. McBean v. Fresno, l l 2 Cal. 159, 44
P. 358 (1896). A contract for the construction of a courthouse and jail, and the
payment of an annual rental, the title at the end of the rental period to vest in the
county, does not create a present indebtedness against the county, for a sum equal to
the aggregate amount of such rentals for the entire period for which the contract is to
run. Giles v. Dennison, 15 Okla. 55, 78 P. 174 (1904). It is the rule of Indiana that
when a municipal corporation contracts for necessary things, such as water or light,
and agrees to pay for it annually or monthly as furnished, the contract does not create
an indebtedness for the aggregate sum of all the instalments, since the indebtedness for
each year or month does not come into existence until it is earned. The earning of
each year's or month's compensation is essential to the existence of the debt. City of
La Porte v. Gamewell Fire Alarm Teleg. Co., 146 Ind. 466, 45 N. E. 588 (1896).
5
In re Opinion of the Governor, 54 R. I. 45, 169 A.· 748 (1933). Although
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In the instant case there wo~ld have been no difference in legal effect if the
state had issued the bonds promising to pay only out of the income derived therefrom, rather than transferring the property to a separate bond issuing agency,
and then promising through another agent, the department of welfare, to
redeem the bonds. But why was this not a valid arrangement under the second
method of evading debt limitations? Did not the authority promise to pay
only out of the income to be derived from the property? The court pointed out
two distinguishing features which made the general rule inapplicable: (I) when
the department of welfare promised to pay rent and retire the bonds, a direct
obligation of the state was created; (2) in so far as the state promised to pay
the income from property already in existence, a debt was incurred because the
state contracted to apply on the debt money which would otherwise have been
available for general disposition. A number of early decisions putting this qualification on the pay-out-of-income doctrine seemed to be based on the same
theory the Ohio court stated-that the diversion of any special fund which
would have otherwise augmented the general fund is a payment out of the
general fund. 6 However, Illinois has allowed the financing of improvements
out of combined income from the former property and improvements, but only
when the property was not mortgaged.7 This is a departure from the general
rule, and a limitation on the reasoning of the earlier Illinois decisions. Payment
it was expressly ruled that the debts of the Rhode Island Emergency Public Works
Corporation would not be debts of the state, it was also held that if the state transferred its property as a pledge or security for the corporation's debts, the transaction
would result in an indebtedness of the state. That is analogous to the promise of the
state in the instant case to pay a certain rent through its agent, which rent is then
pledged by the authority.
6 City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457 at 463, 62 N. E. 861 (1902), where
the court said: "The city is to lose property in the form of established income for the
purpose of paying the certificates. If the city, being indebted beyond the constitutional
limit, can issue certificates payable out of that fund without creating a debt, it would
be equally within its power to issue obligations by pledging the fund derived from
dram-shop licenses, or licenses from hackmen, peddlers, theaters or amusements, or
any other funds of the city. All of the revenues of the city, except such as would be
derived from general taxation, might in that way be pledged or mortgaged for long
years to cm;ne, and we apprehend that no one would be found to say that such a
scheme would not be a mere evasion of the constitution."
7 Maffit v. City of Decatur, 322 Ill. 82, 152 N. E. 602 (1926); Ward v. City
of Chicago, 342 Ill. 167 at 174, 173 N. E. 810 (1930). In the last case the court
said: "The position thus taken seems to be that pledging the water fund creates
indebtedness within the constitutional prohibition uuless the pledge is confined to
such precise income as can be directly traced to the particular new physical element
of the plant to pay for which the obligation secured was issued, leaving the original
income in effect intact and usable by the city for other purposes altogether. The
Decatur case is decisive against the soundness of such a position. There the income
from the original plant was in effect cut off and lumped into the fund resulting from
the operation of the plant as eularged. It is not apparent that any effort was there
made to preserve such original income intact or exempt it in any manner or degree
from the claim of the water company.•••" The court distinguished this case from
City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194 Ill. 457, 62 N. E. 861 (1902), where the original
property was mortgaged.
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out of the fund attributable to the old property, as well as that attributable to the
improvements, is deemed to be a lawful diversion of a special fund and does not
create an indebtedness against the general funds of the state unless the property
is mortgaged; in the latter case, if the special fund does not cover the debt,
the general funds would have to be used to prevent foreclosure on the state's
property. It is not clear whether Ohio would adopt this last Illinois rule, since
the proper situation was not presented. The provisions for receivership in case
of default would have prevented the application of the Illinois rule. 8 As to the
obligation of the state to pay the amount of the bonds in the form of rent instalments, apparently Ohio has never adopted and was not asked to adopt the rule
prevailing in some states that the amount of the indebtedness is measured not
by the aggregate amount promised to be paid, but by the amount of each instalment, at least when the performance is serial and divisible on each side. Since
this view amounts to a serious judicial restriction on the debt limitation laws,
it seems to have been confined in most cases to a narrow range of government
contracts-namely, those in which the government contracted with a government-owned utility for gas, electricity, or water service for its citizens over a
period of years. 9 Courts which uphold these contracts evidently feel that the
government in these cases is a kind of middleman and will probably collect
enough from the consumers to meet the instalments. But that situation is not
wholly different from the principal case where the state, through an agency,
rented hospitals from a state corporation intending to meet its rental obligations
by charging the patients.
James W. Deer
8
Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 343, 190 N. E. 766 (1934), seems
to be decided on the proposition that when the village promised to pay out of the
income to be derived from property already in existence it created an indebtedness,
even though there was no provision for receivership or foreclosure which could bring
about a forfeiture of the municipality's property. But the Ohio constitutional debt
limitation on municipalities, art. 8, § 6, is worded differently from art. 8, § 3, the
provision containing the debt limitation on the state. A municipality may not "loan
its credit to, or in aid of, any such company, corporation, or association." The principal case cites Village of Brewster v. Hill, supra, and City of Joliet v. Alexander, 194
Ill. 457, 62 N. E. 861 (1902), supra note 6, without discussion of the fact that the
Brewster case follows the Joliet case, although on its facts the Brewster case is more
like Ward v. Chicago, 342 Ill. 167, 173 N. E. 810 (1930), and Maffit v. City of
Decatur, 322 Ill. 82, 152 N. E. 602 (1926), supra note 7. It is not clear whether
the Brewster case was decided as it was because 'Ohio would not follow Ward v.
Chicago or because the language of art. 8, § 6, of the Ohio Constitution requires a
narrower construction of the special fund theory. But if the Brewster case was sufficient to cover the principal case it was not necessary for the court to discuss, as it
did, that the bondholders' remedies in case of default might result in forfeiture of
state property. If jeopardy of forfeiture was the ground of the principal decision,
absence of such features might have been held valid as in the Ward case and Decatur
case, despite the Brewster case' involving municipalities.
9 Cases are collected in I DILLON, MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONs, 5th ed., § 196
(1911). See note 4, supra, and also 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1058 at 1063 (1912), for
a discussion of the distinction made by some states: ( l) instalment contracts in which
the liability of the municipality depends upon receipt of the consideration in instalments, and (2) instalment contracts in which the liability may be fixed, as a contract
for the erection of a public building.

